Nagaraju Kodalapura N
Offensive Security Researcher
Intel Corporation
Nagaraju N Kodalapura (Raju) is the Principal Engineer: Offensive Security research in Intel Corporation with 25 years of experience in semiconductor industry and 15+ years of experience in the security research space. He received his M.S. degree in Digital Design and Embedded Systems from Manipal University, India. He holds 5 Granted Intel Patents and is an IEEE Senior Member with 5+ security research publications in IEEE international conferences, Black Hat, and other renowned venues. He leads a team of offensive security researchers focusing on Confidential Computing and Virtualization technologies.
Speaker sessions
Briefings and Arsenals | Confirmed Speakers | No Session Assigned
Placeholder session for confirmed speakers without an assigned session, allowing them to be pushed to Swapcard and Visit.
- 07:30
- Tue
- 01 Dec
Stage:
Briefing Stage 2
Sessions Type:
Keynote
MemHack: Hijacking private memory regions of Intel�s SGX and TDX Apps using Error Injection techniques and driving mitigations
Confidential computing technologies in general rely upon hardware-based memory encryption techniques to protect end user data and code by placing them in the encrypted, private memory regions in system physical memory or DRAM. Hence there is a strong requirement of trust and assumption that the encrypted memory regions must be secure to store the security sensitive data and code. Though this security requirement is correct, confidential computing technologies like Intel SGX (Software Guard Extensions) and TDX (Trust Domain Extensions) which are supported on general purpose server CPUs and platforms that are used for cloud computing usages and that support different platform features such as RAS (Reliability, Availability and Serviceability) capabilities etc. In this presentation, we give a quick introduction to security objectives and threat model of Intel�s confidential computing technologies followed by a quick introduction to RAS features. We shall provide a quick overview of how a RAS feature, namely, Error Injection (ERR_INJ). We shall then focus on the �threat model� associated with confidential computing and discuss how ERR_INJ feature at the platform level could be abused by an attacker to compromise confidential computing . The presentation shall highlight the abuse of ERR_INJ techniques to compromise private memory regions in DRAM of Intel�s SGX applications and then show how such attacks were successfully mitigated on Intel�s SGX and TDX technologies.
- 13:30
- Thu
- 03 Dec
Stage:
Briefing Stage 2
Sessions Type:
Keynote